The Yakutia small nuclear power plant is not sited at Ust-Kuyga because the site is optimal for a reactor. It is sited there because the Kyuchus gold deposit’s development rights were auctioned in October 2021 with a condition attached: the winner would have to use at least 35 MW of nuclear-generated electricity. The January 2022 agreement between Rusatom Overseas and Seligdar is the commercial formalization of that condition, not the origin of the siting decision. Read the sequence in that order and the project looks less like a nuclear siting choice and more like a mining-licence instrument.
The deposit and the condition
Kyuchus is described in the January 2022 coverage as one of Russia’s largest gold deposits, with reserves exceeding 175 tonnes. The reported breakdown is 70.9 t of C1 reserves and 38.4 t of C2 reserves amenable to open-pit mining, 65.9 t of C2 reserves amenable to underground mining, and 41.9 t of P1 resources plus 211.1 t of P2 resources. Those are the figures attached to the project at the time of the agreement; they are not a statement about what has been mined since.
The condition that matters is stated plainly in World Nuclear News’s report on the deal: agreeing to use at least 35 MW of nuclear power was one of the conditions of the October auction of the deposit’s development rights. That is the pivot. The power obligation was attached to the mining asset before the Rosatom agreement existed. The agreement then supplied the counterparty and the reactor type.
What the 2022 agreement actually says
The Rusatom Overseas–Seligdar agreement, signed in January 2022, sets a 40-year period of electrical power supply from a land-based SMR with a RITM-200N reactor, starting 30 June 2028. Seligdar is to use at least 35 MW of nuclear-generated electricity in the Kyuchus project. The parties stated an intention to sign a contract for energy supply before 30 September 2025.
Two things should be kept separate here. The 40-year supply term and the 35 MW offtake are the commercial terms of the agreement. The 30 September 2025 date is a stated intention in a January 2022 document. The retrieved material does not confirm whether that contract was signed. Treat the 2028 commissioning date as a plan, not an outcome.
The plant itself is described as a RITM-200N unit with a capacity of 55 MW, and as Rosatom’s flagship project in the land-based small nuclear power plant segment. The 55 MW figure and the ‘at least 35 MW’ offtake are different numbers from different sources; they should not be conflated. The reactor is adapted from the RITM-200 series used on Russia’s nuclear icebreakers. Six RITM reactors had already been manufactured and used in the icebreaker fleet, and the land-based unit would be the first such application, drawing on what Rosatom described as more than 400 reactor-years of small-reactor operating experience.
The mechanism: a licence condition as an anchor contract
For a remote Arctic load with no grid connection and no economic case for a large plant, the usual problem is that generation has no creditworthy customer. A first-of-a-kind reactor at a village in Ust-Yansky District would not clear that bar on merchant power sales alone. The auction condition solves it from the other direction: it converts the mining licence into a commitment to buy nuclear electricity, which in turn gives the reactor project a named industrial anchor before construction begins.
The same condition, read from the miner’s side, converts a gold deposit into an asset that cannot be developed on its pre-existing energy basis. That is the two-sided lock-in, and it is the analytically interesting part. Neither the reactor nor the deposit is independently viable at Ust-Kuyga on the evidence available, so the licence instrument binds them together. Whether that binding is a strength or a fragility depends on which side slips first — reactor schedule or deposit development.
The stated rationale for SMRs in this setting is consistent with that reading. The plant is described as designed to supply power to isolated energy grids or remote territories and consumers, and the project is framed as serving a mineral resource centre that would also involve the Deputatskoye and Tirekhtyakh deposits, plus a 110 (220) kV transmission line from Ust-Kuiga to Tirekhtyakh to Deputatsky. That wider framing is a later, broader claim about what the plant is for. The original 35 MW commitment is narrower: one anchor customer, one deposit.
Status: what has actually been done
The retrieved record shows preparatory work, not completion. Rostekhnadzor granted the construction licence in April 2023. Rosenergoatom was designated the operating organisation. Rosprirodnadzor approved a positive conclusion of the state environmental impact expert commission on materials justifying the construction licence for the No. 1 power unit, following public hearings in Ust-Kuiga in December 2023.
By February 2024, Rosatom reported that a first construction camp for 250 persons had been completed, first-stage construction of a second camp for 683 persons had begun, and construction of a new 12-kilometre road linking Ust-Kuyga to the SMR site had started. A separate project description refers to a temporary construction camp for 1,500 people, an access road from Ust-Kuiga to the site, and production and technical base No. 2. The stated aim is a plant providing at least 55 MW of electric power, with non-replaceable equipment service life up to 60 years.
What the record does not show is the plant built, operating, or commissioned. It does not confirm the energy supply contract contemplated before 30 September 2025. It does not give a capital cost, tariff, or financing structure. Those gaps are not minor; they are the difference between a project with a licence and a project with a completed balance sheet.
What the case does and does not demonstrate
It demonstrates a mechanism: a mining-licence condition can anchor remote generation by attaching an offtake obligation to the asset that needs the power. That is a transferable idea for any jurisdiction trying to pair a first-of-a-kind plant with a remote industrial load.
It does not demonstrate that the economics work, that the schedule holds, or that the wider mineral-resource-centre framing will be delivered. The 2028 commissioning date and the 30 September 2025 contract target are both plans stated in source documents, not reported outcomes. The multi-deposit and transmission-line elements carry more of the project’s regional-development rationale than the original 35 MW commitment does, and they should be read as intentions rather than contracted supply.
A structural risk worth stating explicitly: if the deposit’s reserve base were revised downward or development stalled, the licence-attached offtake would not automatically disappear, but the industrial rationale for the plant would. That is the exposure created by anchoring generation to a single mining asset. It is a hypothetical, not a reported development, but it is the obvious failure mode of the design.
FAQ
Is the Ust-Kuyga SMR built? No retrieved source describes it as built, operating, or commissioned. The record shows a construction licence granted in April 2023 and preparatory works reported through February 2024.
Why Ust-Kuyga specifically? Because the Kyuchus development rights were auctioned in October 2021 with a condition requiring at least 35 MW of nuclear-generated electricity. The siting follows the deposit, not the other way around.
What reactor does it use? A RITM-200N, adapted from the RITM-200 series used on nuclear icebreakers. The plant is described as having a capacity of 55 MW.
Was the energy supply contract signed by 30 September 2025? The January 2022 agreement states an intention to sign before that date. The retrieved material does not confirm whether it was signed.
Does the plant supply anything besides Kyuchus? Project descriptions refer to intended involvement with the Deputatskoye and Tirekhtyakh deposits and a 110 (220) kV transmission line. Those are stated intentions, not confirmed contracted supply.
Sources
Global Mining Review, ‘Rosatom and Seligdar sign nuclear energy supply agreement for Kyuchus gold deposit’, 28 January 2022 — agreement terms, reserve figures, siting, commissioning schedule.
World Nuclear News, ‘Deal signed for nuclear to power Russian gold mine’, 21 January 2022 — auction condition, reactor lineage, offtake figure.
Rosatom Newsletter, ‘Rosatom and Seligdar (Russia) signed an Agreement on the Supply and Consumption of Energy Generated by a SMR NPP’, 21 January 2022 — 40-year supply term and start date.
Atommedia, ‘Innovative Yakutian SNPP received…’, undated press release — 55 MW capacity, Rosprirodnadzor conclusion, December 2023 public hearings, construction camp and access road details, multi-deposit and transmission-line framing.
World Nuclear News, ‘Preparatory work stepped up for Russia’s first land-based SMR’, 9 February 2024 — construction licence April 2023, Rosenergoatom designation, camp and road progress, stated plant aim and service life.